What is nationalism definition

It was extolled in classic modern works by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau and is returning to center stage in the debate, though philosophers are now more skeptical see below. Issues surrounding the control of the movement of money and people in particular immigration and the resource rights implied in territorial sovereignty make the topic politically central in the age of globalization and philosophically interesting for nationalists and anti-nationalists alike.

Consequences are varied and quite interested for more see below, especially section 2. In breaking down the issue, we have mentioned the importance of the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their national identity.

This point raises two sorts of questions. First, the descriptive ones:. This section discusses the descriptive questions, starting with 1a and 1b ;the normative questions are addressed in Section 3 on the moral debate. If one wants to enjoin people to struggle for their national interests, one must have some idea about what a nation is and what it is to belong to a nation. So, in order to formulate and ground their evaluations, claims, and directives for action, pro-nationalist thinkers have expounded theories of ethnicity, culture, nation, and state.

Their opponents have in turn challenged these elaborations. Now, some presuppositions about ethnic groups and nations are essential for the nationalist, while others are theoretical elaborations designed to support the essential ones. Since nationalism is particularly prominent with groups that do not yet have a state, a definition of nation and nationalism purely in terms of belonging to a state is a non-starter. The first extreme option has been put forward by a small but distinguished band of theorists.

At the other extreme, and more typically, nationalist claims are focused upon the non-voluntary community of common origin, language, tradition, and culture: the classic ethno-nation is a community of origin and culture, including prominently a language and customs.

One cannot choose to be a member; instead, membership depends on the accident of origin and early socialization.

However, commonality of origin has become mythical for most contemporary candidate groups: ethnic groups have been mixing for millennia. This is the kind of definition that would be accepted by most parties in the debate today. So defined, the nation is a somewhat mixed category, both ethno-cultural and civic, but still closer to the purely ethno-cultural than to the purely civic extreme.

In social and political science one usually distinguishes two kinds of views, but there is a third group, combining element from both. The first are modernist views that see nationalism as born in modern times, together with nation-states. The third, quite plausible kind of view, distinct from both primordialism-ethno-symbolism and modernism, has been initiated by W.

Connor So, the origins of nationalism predate the modern state, and its emotional content remains up to our times Conversi , but the actual statist organization is, indeed, modern.

However, nation-state is a nationalist dream and fiction, never really implemented, due to the inescapable plurality of social groups. So much for the three dominant perspectives on the origin of nationalism. Indeed, the older authors—from great thinkers like Herder and Otto Bauer to the propagandists who followed their footsteps—took great pains to ground normative claims upon firm ontological realism about nations: nations are real, bona fide entities.

Let us now turn to question 1c about the nature of pro-national attitudes. The explanatory issue that has interested political and social scientists concerns ethno-nationalist sentiment, the paradigm case of a pro-national attitude.

Is it as irrational, romantic, and indifferent to self-interest as it might seem on the surface? The issue has divided authors who see nationalism as basically irrational and those who try to explain it as being in some sense rational. Authors who see it as irrational propose various explanations of why people assent to irrational views. But where does such false consciousness come from?

On the opposite side, the famous critic of nationalism Elie Kedourie thinks this irrationality is spontaneous. A decade and a half ago Liah Greenfeld went as far as linking nationalism to mental illness in her provocative article see also her book.

On the opposite side, Michael Walzer has offered a sympathetic account of nationalist passion in his Authors relying upon the Marxist tradition offer various deeper explanations. Some authors claim that it is often rational for individuals to become nationalists Hardin Can one rationally explain the extremes of ethno-national conflict? Authors like Russell Hardin propose to do so in terms of a general view of when hostile behavior is rational: most typically, if an individual has no reason to trust someone, it is reasonable for that individual to take precautions against the other.

If both sides take precautions, however, each will tend to see the other as increasingly inimical. It then becomes rational to start treating the other as an enemy. Mere suspicion can thus lead by small, individually rational steps to a situation of conflict. It is relatively easy to spot the circumstances in which this general pattern applies to national solidarities and conflicts see also Wimmer We pointed out at the very beginning of the entry that nationalism focuses upon 1 the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their national identity, and 2 the actions that the members of a nation take when seeking to achieve or sustain some form of political sovereignty.

The politically central point is 2 : the actions enjoined by the nationalist. To these we now turn, beginning with sovereignty and territory, the usual foci of a national struggle for independence. They raise an important issue:. The classical answer is that a state is required.

A more liberal answer is that some form of political autonomy suffices. Once this has been discussed, we can turn to the related normative issues:. Consider first the classical nationalist answer to 2a. Developments of this line of thought often state or imply specific answers to 2b , and 2c , i.

However, classical nationalism is not only concerned with the creation of a state but also with its maintenance and strengthening. Classical nationalists are usually vigilant about the kind of culture they protect and promote and about the kind of attitude people have to their nation-state.

This watchful attitude carries some potential dangers: many elements of a given culture that are universal or simply not recognizably national may fall prey to such nationalist enthusiasms. Classical nationalism in everyday life puts various additional demands on individuals, from buying more expensive home-produced goods in preference to cheaper imported ones to procreating as many future members of the nation as one can manage see Yuval-Davies , and Yack Besides classical nationalism and its more radical extremist cousins , various moderate views are also now classified as nationalist.

Indeed, the philosophical discussion has shifted to these moderate or even ultra-moderate forms, and most philosophers who describe themselves as nationalists propose very moderate nationalist programs. Nationalism in this wider sense is any complex of attitudes, claims, and directives for action ascribing a fundamental political, moral, and cultural value to nation and nationality and deriving obligations for individual members of the nation, and for any involved third parties, individual or collective from this ascribed value.

The main representative of this group of views is liberal nationalism , proposed by authors like Miller, Tamir, and Gans see below. Nationalisms in this wider sense can vary somewhat in their conceptions of the nation which are often left implicit in their discourse , in the grounds for and degree of its value, and in the scope of their prescribed obligations. Liberal nationalists see liberal-democratic principles and pro-national attitudes as belonging together.

Of course, some things have to be sacrificed: we must acknowledge that either the meaningfulness of a community or its openness must be sacrificed to some extent as we cannot have them both. How much of each is to give way is left open, and of course, various liberal nationalists take different views of what precisely the right answer is. They both see the feeling of national identity as a feeling that promotes solidarity, and solidarity as means for increased social justice Tamir , in particular ch.

Liberal nationalists diverge about the value of multiculturalism. Kymlicka takes it as basic for his picture of liberalism while Tamir dismisses it without much ado: multicultural, multiethnic democracies have a very poor track record, she claims Tamir lists two kinds of reasons that guarantee special political status to nations. The historical development of liberalism turned it into a universalistic, anti-communitarian principle; this has been a fatal mistake that can be and should be corrected by the liberal nationalist synthesis.

Can we revive the unifying narratives of our nationality without sacrificing the liberal inheritance of freedom and rights? Liberal nationalism answers in the affirmative. Interestingly, Tamir combines this high regard of nation with an extreme constructivist view of its nature: nations are mental structures that exist in the minds of their members Is liberal nationalism implemented anywhere in the present world, or is it more of an ideal, probably end-state theory, that proposes a picture of a desirable society?

Judging by the writings of liberal nationalists, it is the latter, although presented as a relatively easily reachable ideal, combining two traditions that are already well implemented in political reality. The variations of nationalism most relevant for philosophy are those that influence the moral standing of claims and of recommended nationalist practices.

The central theoretical nationalist evaluative claims can be charted on the map of possible positions within political theory in the following useful but somewhat simplified and schematic way. Nationalist claims featuring the nation as central to political action must answer two crucial general questions.

First, is there one kind of large social group that is of special moral importance? The nationalist answer is that there certainly is one, namely, the nation. Moreover, when an ultimate choice is to be made, say between ties of family, or friendship, and the nation, the latter has priority. Are they based on voluntary or involuntary membership in the group?

On the philosophical map, pro-nationalist normative tastes fit nicely with the communitarian stance in general: most pro-nationalist philosophers are communitarians who choose the nation as the preferred community in contrast to those of their fellow communitarians who prefer more far-ranging communities, such as those defined by global religious traditions.

Before proceeding to moral claims, let us briefly sketch the issues and viewpoints connected to territory and territorial rights that are essential for nationalist political programs.

Its primary importance resides in sovereignty and all the associated possibilities for internal control and external exclusion. What about the grounds for the demand for territorial rights? Nationalist and pro-nationalist views mostly rely on the attachment that members of a nation have to national territory and to the formative value of territory for a nation to justify territorial claims see Miller and Meisels These attachment views stand in stark contrast to more pragmatic views about territorial rights as means for conflict resolution e.

Another quite popular alternative is the family of individualistic views grounding territorial rights in rights and interests of individuals. We now pass to the normative dimension of nationalism. We shall first describe the very heart of the nationalist program, i. These claims can be seen as answers to the normative subset of our initial questions about 1 pro-national attitudes and 2 actions. We will see that these claims recommend various courses of action: centrally, those meant to secure and sustain a political organization for the given ethno-cultural national community thereby making more specific the answers to our normative questions 1e , 1f , 2b , and 2c.

Finally, we shall discuss various lines of pro-nationalist thought that have been put forward in defense of these claims. To begin, let us return to the claims concerning the furthering of the national state and culture.

These are proposed by the nationalist as norms of conduct. The philosophically most important variations concern three aspects of such normative claims:. Universalizing nationalism is the political program that claims that every ethno-nation should have a state that it should rightfully own and the interests of which it should promote.

Particularistic nationalism is the political program claiming that some ethno-nation should have its state, without extending the claim to all ethno-nations. It claims thus either. The most difficult and indeed chauvinistic sub-case of particularism, i. Serious theoretical nationalists usually defend only the universalist variety, whereas the nationalist-in-the-street most often defends the egoistic indeterminate one. Put starkly, the view is that morality ends at the boundaries of the nation-state; beyond there is nothing but anarchy.

Recall the initial normative question centered around 1 attitudes and 2 actions. Is national partiality justified, and to what extent? What actions are appropriate to bring about sovereignty? In particular, are ethno-national states and institutionally protected ethno- national cultures goods independent from the individual will of their members, and how far may one go in protecting them?

The philosophical debate for and against nationalism is a debate about the moral validity of its central claims. In particular, the ultimate moral issue is the following: is any form of nationalism morally permissible or justified, and, if not, how bad are particular forms of it? In some situations they seem plausible: for instance, the plight of some stateless national groups—the history of Jews and Armenians, the historical and contemporary misfortunes of Kurds—lends credence to the idea that having their own state would have solved the worst problems.

Still, there are good reasons to examine nationalist claims more carefully. The most general reason is that it should first be shown that the political form of the nation-state has some value as such, that a national community has a particular, or even central, moral and political value, and that claims in its favor have normative validity.

Once this is established, a further defense is needed. Some classical nationalist claims appear to clash—at least under normal circumstances of contemporary life—with various values that people tend to accept. Some of these values are considered essential to liberal-democratic societies, while others are important specifically for the flourishing of creativity and culture. Liberal nationalists are aware of the difficulties of the classical approach, and soften the classical claims, giving them only a prima facie status.

Such thoughtful pro-nationalist writers have participated in an ongoing philosophical dialogue between proponents and opponents of the claim. Further lines of thought built upon these considerations can be used to defend very different varieties of nationalism, from radical to very moderate ones.

For brevity, each line of thought will be reduced to a brief argument; the actual debate is more involved than one can represent in a sketch. Some prominent lines of criticism that have been put forward in the debate will be indicated in brackets see Miscevic The main arguments in favor of nationalism will be divided into two sets. The first set of arguments defends the claim that national communities have a high value, sometime seen as coming from the interests of their individual member e.

The first set will be presented in more detail since it has formed the core of the debate. It depicts the community as the source of value or as the transmission device connecting its members to some important values.

In , the United States elected populist Donald Trump to the presidency. In , President Trump declared at a Texas rally that he was a nationalist, though many felt that was already evident from his protectionist policies. He and his former adviser Steve Bannon had often advocated for economic nationalism.

Economic nationalism is a form of nationalism that specifically prioritizes domestic businesses. It seeks to defend them against multinational corporations that benefit from globalism. It advocates protectionism and other trade policies that protect local industries. President Trump espoused economic nationalism when he announced tariffs on steel and Chinese imports.

Economic nationalism also prefers bilateral trade agreements between two countries. It says that multilateral agreements benefit corporations at the expense of individual nations. It would even adopt unilateral agreements where the stronger nation forces a weaker nation to adopt trade policies that favor the stronger country. After the stock market crash of , countries began adopting protectionist measures in a desperate attempt to save jobs.

As a result, those measures likely prolonged the Great Depression. To compensate for less trade, economic nationalism advocates increased fiscal policies to help businesses. This includes increased government spending on infrastructure and tax cuts for businesses. Economic nationalism opposes immigration, arguing that it takes jobs away from domestic workers.

President Trump's immigration policies followed nationalism when he promised to build a wall on the border with Mexico. Actively scan device characteristics for identification. Use precise geolocation data. Select personalised content.

Create a personalised content profile. Measure ad performance. Select basic ads. Create a personalised ads profile. Select personalised ads. Apply market research to generate audience insights.

Measure content performance. Develop and improve products. List of Partners vendors. Table of Contents Expand. Table of Contents. Nationalism Explained. Nationalism vs. The History of Nationalism. In the atomic age, however, national egotism conflicts with the conditions for national self-preservation, because national self-preservation requires the subordination of national sovereignty to an international sovereignty and the subordination of national economic interests to those of the whole world.

The true nationalist must therefore become a true internationalist in order to avoid the peril of the impoverishment and destruction of his nation. This author points out that the dehumanization of people of other races is a part of the rationalization process designed to provide acceptable reason for killing, especially mass killing. Rationalization actually encompasses two steps.

The first step is deindividualization: people of another ethnonational background and another race, too are not looked upon as individuals but rather as a type or a stereotype. The stereotypical view of other people supersedes the individualized approach aimed at respecting the individual specificities of every human being. McCall et al. Although they considers a relationship between two individuals to be the basic form of social relationship and thereby of social organization, the authors assert that a dyadic relationship is in many regards comparable to relations existing in groups and communities.

Allport points out that attitude and belief are at one and the same time related and different, particularly ethnocentric attitudes and beliefs e. The process is one of rationalization—of the accommodation of beliefs to attitudes. According to van Dijk , ethnic prejudice has five basic properties. Bay et al. Both can be presented on a dimension.

On one pole of this dimension are persons showing a high power orientation, low people orientation, and strong hostility toward outgroups; on the other pole are persons showing low power orientation, high people orientation, and no or very little hostility to outgroups. According to the authors, people-oriented identification means identifications with people as individual human beings, independently of their social status or power, and power-oriented identification means an identification with symbols of power and authority, that is, with events, institutions, persons, or any other objects in so far as they are perceived as representing power and authority.

Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders. They do not overlap completely.

I have witnessed many a time this kind of switching from one nationalism to another during the most recent clashes among the ethnonational groups in the Balkans.

About the mythopoeic dimension of nationalism see Smith If there is no suitable past, it can always be invented The past legitimizes. Many scholars consider nationalism to be one of the forms of historicist culture cf. Breuilly, ; Smith, , and others. In comparing the popularity of the nationalist and Marxist explications of human suffering, Moore points to the general advantage of nationalism.

There is no need for nuances and complicated causal links. Class consciousness, on the other hand, runs counter to many obvious facts from daily experience. It is also not so easy to make a steelworker believe that he has a great deal in common with a brewery worker if the price of beer goes up The foreign enemy is also a relatively safe target for day-to-day symbolic aggression. Retaliation is far less likely than in the case of an attack on local power-holders.

For that reason too the attack is much more likely to attract diverse social support. There are many aspects of the relationship between religion and nationalism.

We will mention but a few of them. Nationalism is a substitute for religion. The binding force of nationalism plays the role which religious beliefs used to perform. Nationalism and proletarianism are secularized alternatives to the surviving religious patterns, answering to the need of personalities to restabilize themselves in a mobile world.

The intellect constructs a speculative theology or mythology of nationalism. The emotions arouse a joy and an ecstasy in the contemplation of the national god who is all-god and all-protecting, a longing for his favors, a thankfulness for his benefits, a fear of offending him, and feelings of awe and reverence at the immensity of his power and wisdom; they express themselves naturally in worship, both private and public.

For nationalism, again like any other religion, is social, and its chief rites are public rites performed in the name and for the salvation of a whole community. Religion is a political extension of traditional religions. Smith, The notion of political religion in the sense in which Apter uses this term in some way exemplifies this aspect of the relationship between religion and nationalism.

Reconciliation systems a government of laws and not of humans are undergoing, according to this author, a crisis intensified by the secularization of the religious sphere.